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Abstract
The often-posed claim that Europe is a pessimistic continent is not unjustified. In 2012, 53 percent of 
European Union (EU) citizens were pessimistic about their country. Surprisingly, however, societal pessimism 
has received very little scientific attention. In this article, we examine to what extent political and economic 
factors drive societal pessimism. In terms of political factors, we expect that supranationalization, political 
instability, and corruption increase societal pessimism, as they diminish national political power and can 
inspire collective powerlessness. Economically, we expect that the retrenchment of welfare state provisions 
and economic decline drive societal pessimism, as these developments contribute to socioeconomic 
vulnerability. We assess the impact of these political and economic factors on the level of societal pessimism 
in the EU, both cross-nationally and over time, through multilevel analyses of Eurobarometer data (13 
waves between 2006 and 2012 in 23 EU countries). Our findings show that the political factors (changes in 
government, corruption) primarily explain cross-national differences in societal pessimism, while the macro-
economic context (economic growth, unemployment) primarily explains longitudinal trends within countries. 
These findings demonstrate that, to a large extent, societal pessimism cannot be viewed separately from its 
political and economic context.
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Introduction
The concern that society is changing for the worse is prevalent in many Western countries. Public 
opinion data show that many Europeans and Americans think that their country is heading in the 
wrong direction (European Commission, 2013b; Gallup, 2014). Intellectuals in these countries 
signal a sentiment of pessimism in Western countries (Mahbubani, 2008), and portray Western 
countries as feeling out of control of their own destiny (Moïsi, 2009). Societal pessimism has also 
become a relevant factor politically. American voters for example are strongly divided along parti-
san lines in terms of societal pessimism. During the 2016 Presidential campaign, 69 percent of 
Trump voters thought the country was going in the wrong direction, compared to merely 8 percent 
of the Clinton voters (New York Times, 2016). Furthermore, European leaders warn against the 
serious social, economic, and political consequences of pessimism. The French president, François 
Hollande, and the Dutch prime minister, Mark Rutte (RTL Nieuws, 2013; The Times, 2015), as 
well as Pope Francis in his 2014 address to the European Parliament (Vatican Network, 2014), 
have argued that a less pessimistic outlook is needed to prevent societal and economic stagnation 
or even deterioration. There are similar arguments in the scholarly literature, that is, that societal 
pessimism has real consequences by reducing trust in public institutions (Mazarr, 1998; McKenzie, 
1997; Whitman, 1998). Nevertheless, despite calls for more scholarly attention (Eckersley, 2000, 
2013; Kroll and Delhey, 2013), societal pessimism is greatly understudied.
While opinion leaders, politicians, and scholars warn against pessimism’s detrimental conse-
quences, they pay little attention to its sources. There is a wide range of influential theoretical 
contributions that trace back a supposed societal decline to specific political and economic causes 
(e.g. Bauman, 2000, 2007; Beck, 1992; Taylor, 1991). Nevertheless, even these general theoretical 
suggestions about the political and economic roots of societal pessimism are rarely specified. This 
is remarkable. In related fields of public opinion research, political and economic performances are 
consistently important macro-level determinants of, for example, political trust (e.g. Anderson and 
Guillory, 1997; Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012; Mishler and Rose, 2001), social trust (e.g. 
Bjørnskov, 2007; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005), and happiness (e.g. Hagerty and Veenhoven, 2003; 
Tavits, 2008).
The political and economic contexts are also likely to influence societal pessimism. The Great 
Recession hit European economies hard after the summer of 2008. Its consequences were substan-
tial in Europe, increasing unemployment and government deficits, and resulting in austerity meas-
ures and fundamental reforms, in some cases enforced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the European Commission. Concurrently, Europe saw an increase in electoral volatility (Mair, 
2008) and a rise of radical right parties (Mudde, 2007), undermining the stability of governmental 
coalitions.
This article formulates hypotheses on the influence of political and economic factors on societal 
pessimism, and tests the extent to which it is affected by the political (supranationalization, politi-
cal instability, and corruption) and economic context (retrenchment of welfare state provisions, 
economic growth, unemployment, and inflation). We employ multilevel modeling to analyze 13 
waves of the Eurobarometer (EB) that cover 23 European Union (EU) countries between 2006 and 
2012. These waves are enriched with the political and economic contextual measures referred to 
above cross-nationally (between countries) and longitudinally (within countries) in a single model.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides a test of to what extent 
societal pessimism reflects the political and economic context. Second, it contributes to public 
opinion research in two ways: (1) we demonstrate the significant effects of contextual factors on 
public opinion that are only infrequently included in public opinion research, namely, supranation-
alization and political instability; and (2) we distinguish between cross-national and longitudinal 
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differences in societal pessimism, showing that these are explained by dissimilar factors. This 
reinforces the recent push in the literature for more comprehensive cross-national and longitudinal 
analyses (cf. Schmidt-Catran, 2014; Te Grotenhuis et al., 2015; Van Erkel and Van der Meer, 2016). 
Third, we provide more insight into societal pessimism itself, its cross-national distribution, vola-
tility, and individual-level determinants.
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss and define societal pessi-
mism, before turning to a general reflection on which of its roots to consider. We continue with 
specific sections on the political and economic causes in which we hypothesize on country char-
acteristics. After describing the data used and the modeling technique, we present the descriptive 
patterns, the effects of the political and economic factors, and tests for mediation. The conclusion 
summarizes our findings, reflects on the study’s limitations, and makes suggestions for further 
research.
Theoretical framework
Societal pessimism
Despite a wide range of influential theoretical accounts on societal decline (Bauman, 2000; 
Beck, 1992; Bennett, 2001; Taylor, 1991), remarkably few scholars have explored whether citi-
zens hold pessimistic views about society. A concern about the state of society can be found in 
the work of Mills (1971 [1959]), who uses the term uneasiness to refer to a feeling that somehow 
something is a threat, without knowing what is threatened or by whom. Bennett (2001) describes 
cultural pessimism theoretically as the sense that one’s culture is in decline. He describes this 
sentiment in relation to environmental, moral, intellectual, and political concerns. Elchardus and 
Smits (2007) speak of ‘a lack of well-being about [being part of] society’ (p. 104), but do not 
specify a particular object of concern. Others focus on the opposite position, namely, positive, 
optimistic notions of society. Uslaner (2002) examines the effect of optimism on social trust. He 
does not, however, make a distinction between personal and societal optimism (or pessimism); 
in his work, optimism relates to expecting success (or the worst) with regard to both personal 
matters and society as a whole. Social actualization – the sense that society has potential – is one 
of the five dimensions of social well-being (Gallagher et al., 2009; Huppert et al., 2009; Keyes, 
1998; Keyes and Shapiro, 2004).
This article follows a recent conceptualization of Steenvoorden (2015) who describes the con-
cern about society as the perception of unmanageable deterioration and a collective powerlessness 
to improve conditions. In line with Steenvoorden (2015), we define societal pessimism as the 
concern among citizens that their society is in decline. Several elements in this definition deserve 
attention. First, this broad definition focuses on the sense of decline, without specifying which ele-
ments of society are declining. The core aspect of societal pessimism is the general perception of 
societal deterioration rather than a perception of the specific elements of society that may be in 
decline. Any specification of the object of the sense of decline is therefore beside the point and part 
of the explanans rather than the explanandum. We therefore operationalize the concept as a 
respondent’s perception of whether their country is heading in the right or wrong direction.
Second, it is important to conceptualize societal pessimism as a sociotropic rather than an ego-
tropic attitude (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; Steenvoorden, 2015),1 as it reflects how people perceive 
society at large rather than their own personal position. This sharpens the conceptual boundaries 
with other concepts and sets societal pessimism apart from personal well-being, which is a position 
that others have also adopted (Eckersley, 2000, 2013; Kroll and Delhey, 2013). The sociotropic 
focus also distinguishes societal pessimism from the use of optimism (Uslaner, 2002) and social 
Steenvoorden and van der Meer 195
actualization (e.g. Keyes, 1998; Keyes and Shapiro, 2004). Third, we believe that because societal 
pessimism reflects sociotropic problems, the term concern is more appropriate than anxiety or fear 
because the latter imply more distress.
Despite similarities, societal pessimism is distinct from related sociological concepts. For 
instance, anomie – unlimited expectations and normlessness (Durkheim, 1951 [1897]), or deviant, 
illegitimate behavior (Merton, 1938) – is a characteristic of society itself, not an evaluation of 
society by its citizens like societal pessimism. The concepts anomia (e.g. Dean, 1961; Legge et al., 
2008) and alienation (Seeman, 1975, 1983) describe the mental state of individuals, and resent-
ment emphasizes one’s relative position (Barbalet, 2001; Meltzer and Musolf, 2002; Webber, 
2007), rather than the state of society at large. Finally, societal pessimism is also different from 
personal satisfaction with life and well-being (Eckersley, 2000, 2013; Kroll and Delhey, 2013).
Roots of societal pessimism
One stream of research focuses on an apparent gap between personal well-being and public pes-
simism. These authors argue that pessimism about the future of society is often unjustified and 
based on overly negative media reports (McKenzie, 1997; Whitman, 1998). Whitman suggests two 
explanations of that gap: a psychological mechanism and a media effect. The former is the general 
tendency in human nature to expect better things for ourselves than average, while the latter points 
to a major influence of media reports on evaluations of the state of society, which is in contrast to 
its negligible effect on the evaluation of one’s personal circumstances.2
The much larger empirical body of public opinion research on a wide range of attitudes implies 
the opposite, however, namely that societal pessimism reflects the societal context. In many 
instances, research demonstrates the influence of the social, political, and economic contexts on 
happiness, social trust, and political trust (e.g. Bjørnskov, 2007; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Tavits, 
2008). We have little reason to assume that this would be any different for societal pessimism, as it 
is clearly part of public opinion, just like social and political trust.
Political causes of societal pessimism
Politically, we expect a perceived collective powerlessness – that is, the lack of power by society 
and its (political) institutions to change the societal status quo – to stimulate societal pessimism. 
National political institutions and actors are vital in this respect, as they are in the position to per-
form actual changes with regard to where a country is heading. Theoretically as well as empiri-
cally, the perception of loss of national political power contributes to a concern about the state of 
society (Steenvoorden, 2015). Hence, we expect that objective political conditions that diminish 
national political power increase societal pessimism. As a result, our overarching expectation is 
that societal pessimism is greater in contexts where national political institutions are undermined 
in terms of their ability to exert political power. Specifically, we consider three ways in which 
decreasing national political power inspires societal pessimism: supranationalization, political 
instability, and corruption.
A first example of diminishing national political power on the European continent is supranation-
alization, namely, the transfer of political power and resources to the EU. Supranationalization 
reduces the autonomy of national political actors and their ability to act unilaterally (Hay, 2007; 
Scharpf, 2000; Wallace, 1999). In effect, supranationalization diminishes the national grip on soci-
ety’s future, stimulating a sense of collective powerlessness among citizens. This reasoning is also 
present in the public debate, for instance, in the critique of the EU during the Brexit campaign and 
more generally by populist political parties across Europe, which claim that their respective country 
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is losing sovereignty (Van Elsas et al., 2016). Of course, if the national government is failing, the EU 
might be a welcome alternative. We consider the effect of the malfunctioning of national govern-
ments below. Ceteris paribus, we expect that supranationalization increases societal pessimism 
(H1).
We operationalize supranationalization by distinguishing between financial redistribution in the 
EU and adopting the Euro. Countries that benefit financially from the EU value EU institutions 
more and have lower levels of Euroscepticism (Karp et al., 2003; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010; 
Mahler et al., 2000). Financial support from the EU can inspire optimism, whereas the opposite is 
likely in countries that pay more than they receive in subsidies because they have lost control over 
their own resources. We therefore hypothesize that a net payment to the EU increases societal pes-
simism (H1a). Furthermore, the member states of the European Monetary Union (EMU), which 
have the Euro as their currency, experience a much higher level of interference in national deci-
sion-making, with examples being European standards with respect to a country’s maximum 
budget deficit and demands from the EMU on the rate and type of social reforms. As such a loss of 
national autonomy in policy decision-making can add to a sense of collective powerlessness, we 
expect that EMU membership increases societal pessimism (H1b).
Second, political instability also diminishes national political power. When a government brings 
its term in office to an end prematurely – regardless of the nature of the conflict within government 
– it is constrained to deal with new or contentious topics, adding to the impression of collective 
powerlessness and in turn inspiring societal pessimism (cf. Harmel and Robertson, 1986). We 
therefore expect that political instability increases societal pessimism (H2).
Third, corruption also diminishes political power. There is ample evidence of the disruptive 
effect of corruption on collective socio-political attitudes (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Della 
Porta, 2000; Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Zak and Knack, 2001). On 
the surface, corruption undermines the political system’s ability to achieve results. More funda-
mentally, it signals a collective inability or unwillingness to fight for the common good. As we 
expect corruption to lower people’s expectations of societal improvement, the third hypothesis is 
corruption increases societal pessimism (H3).
Economic causes of societal pessimism
While societal pessimism is likely to be induced by collective powerlessness in the political realm, 
it is arguably related to socioeconomic vulnerability in the economic domain. Socioeconomic vul-
nerability here does not refer to people’s personal finances or employment circumstances, but to 
their worries about a general trend in society that socioeconomic guarantees are becoming less 
evident. As the perception of socioeconomic vulnerability stimulates a concern about the state of 
society (Steenvoorden, 2015), we expect an objective economic decline to foster societal pessi-
mism by increasing socioeconomic vulnerability. Various authors discuss such an objective eco-
nomic decline, for example, by arguing that economic transformations have removed old certainties, 
resulting in increased socioeconomic vulnerability for current and future generations (Bauman, 
2007; Ehrenreich, 1989; Samuelson, 1995). This trend of the ‘individualization of risks’ (Bauman, 
2006, 2007) suggests that current personal circumstances have become less stable and more vul-
nerable to change.
One development that increases socioeconomic vulnerability is the retrenchment of welfare 
state provisions across Europe, which corrodes the protection of citizens in a vulnerable position 
(Korpi, 2003; Pierson, 1998). This creates more insecurity for all, which we assume will lower 
expectations about the future of society. We therefore expect that cutbacks in social security 
increase societal pessimism (H4).
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More generally, the macro-economic performance is likely to affect societal pessimism for sim-
ilar reasons. Any fall in a country’s level of wealth is likely to increase perceptions of the overall 
level of socioeconomic vulnerability, as economic recessions tend to deepen societal challenges. 
As a result, we expect that economic decline increases societal pessimism (H5). Specifically, we 
focus on three indicators of macro-economic performance that are known to affect public opinion 
(Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Taylor, 2000): economic growth, unemployment rates, and infla-
tion levels. Hypothesis 5 thus has three components: economic growth (H5a), unemployment rate 
(H5b), and inflation (H5c).
Comparisons composing societal pessimism
Societal pessimism inherently presupposes a comparison. This is particularly relevant to our 
hypotheses on the impact of the political and economic context, which may be conditional on the 
benchmarks that citizens use when they assess the state of society. To the extent that the benchmark 
is based on citizens’ historical experiences (e.g. being used to a high level of economic growth in 
their country), this implies a within-country, longitudinal comparison. Alternatively, the bench-
mark may be based on a comparison to other nations (e.g. performing well in comparison to neigh-
boring countries), which, in turn, implies a cross-national comparison. Finally, the benchmark may 
be an absolute norm (independent of historical experiences or cross-national comparisons) if the 
longitudinal and cross-national analyses produce the same set of determinants of societal pessi-
mism, which is not self-evident (cf. Schmidt-Catran, 2014; Te Grotenhuis et al., 2015; Van Erkel 
and Van der Meer, 2016). Although we are agnostic about the extent to which people make explicit, 
reflective comparisons, or rather implicit, experiential comparisons, we need to accommodate all 
possibilities in our research design. As a result, the design encompasses both cross-national and 
longitudinal effects.
Data and methods
Data and operationalization
Our hypotheses place high demands on the data and research design: they require cross-national 
(covering many countries) and longitudinal survey data (covering many time points). Moreover, 
the survey needs to include measures of societal pessimism. These demands are best met by the EB 
surveys covering 13 waves in the period 2006–2012.3
These particular EB waves include an item about the direction in which citizens think their 
country is heading: ‘At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the 
right direction or in the wrong direction in [your country]’. This item fits the definition of societal 
pessimism because of its broad scope on society as a whole and its focus on the process of decline 
or improvement. Although the words ‘at the present time’ might make respondents focus on short- 
rather than long-term developments, the item nevertheless measures an anticipation of the future. 
The answer categories are ‘things are going in the right direction’ (optimists), ‘things are going in 
the wrong direction’ (pessimists), and a spontaneous ‘neither one nor the other’ (undecided). ‘Don’t 
know’ (2.6%) is treated as missing. We restricted the analysis to countries that have been an EU 
member since the start of this period, and we excluded Cyprus and Greece because of missing data 
in these nations. This left us with 23 countries.4,5
We connected the individual-level survey data to contextual data from various sources. Net 
EU payment was measured with data from the European Commission concerning the net bal-
ance of the costs and benefits to/from the EU in terms of the percentage of gross national 
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income (GNI) (European Commission, 2013a).6,7 EMU membership distinguished between 
non-EMU (reference category), new EMU (which adopted the Euro between 2006 and 2012), 
and established EMU countries.8
We operationalized political instability in two ways. First, we coded early elections in the period 
2000–2011 that were due to an inevitable and obligatory dissolution of parliament (e.g. because of 
conflict within a coalition or a governing party). Early elections that took place on the initiative of 
the government without a preceding political crisis were not coded as such. The longer time span 
was chosen to reflect recent history, which is likely to shape perceptions of political instability. 
Cross-nationally, we coded the number of elections that were classified as early elections. 
Longitudinally, the variable indicates whether early elections took place the year before each wave. 
To isolate the effect of early elections from that of regular elections, we controlled for the number 
of parliamentary elections that had taken place in a country, either in the period 2000–2011 (cross-
nationally) or in the previous year (longitudinally).9
The second measure of political instability focused on the executive, via the number of changes 
in government due to changes in the composition of a government (ministers or parties entering/
leaving the coalition and termination of government). In our cross-sectional models, we relied on 
the total number of changes between 2000 and 2011, again using a longer time span than the indi-
vidual survey data reflect. Longitudinally, the variable indicates the number of changes that took 
place the year before each wave.
Corruption was operationalized with the Corruption Perception Index produced by Transparency 
International, which we recoded so that a low score refers to a low level of corruption (Teorell 
et al., 2013). Cutbacks in social security were measured with yearly differences in the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) salary replacement rate, with a negative 
number indicating a fall in the social security rate over that year.10 Eurostat yearly data on inflation 
and the mean of the two quarters before each wave on gross domestic product (GDP) growth and 
unemployment were used as operationalizations of these economic factors.
On the individual level, we controlled for gender, age (15–24, 25–39, 40–54, 55+), educational 
level (low, medium, high, and student),11 employment status (employed, unemployed, or other – 
which is retired, ill, home-maker, or student), and type of community (rural area or village, small 
or mid-sized town, and large town). All the missing individual-level data were deleted list-wise, 
resulting in 252,393 respondents in all the analyses. Appendix 1 provides an overview of all the 
variables used in the cross-national analyses (the pooled mean of the 13 waves of data for each 
country used in the longitudinal analyses).
To examine the nature of societal pessimism, we repeated all the final analyses while includ-
ing four individual-level attitudes, which were all dummy variables recoded in the negative 
direction: low satisfaction with life (not very or not at all satisfied versus very or fairly satis-
fied), negative economic expectation for the next year (worse versus better or the same), dis-
trust of parliament, and distrust of government (tend to trust versus tend not to trust). The 
correlations of societal pessimism with these attitudes were weak to moderate: 0.21 (low life 
satisfaction), 0.30 (negative economic expectation), 0.39 (distrust of parliament), and 0.41 (dis-
trust of government).
Research design and method
Our hypotheses, measures, and data structure drove the choices for our research design. As the 
dependent variable has three answer categories without a strict, inherent ordering of the classifica-
tions,12 we applied a multinomial regression analysis. We chose optimists as a reference category 
to get a picture of the characteristics that influence societal pessimism.
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As our hypotheses and data structure concern individuals who are nested in countries, we per-
formed a multilevel regression analysis. This allowed us to model both individual and contextual 
determinants simultaneously, and to correctly estimate the standard errors (SEs) at each level of 
analysis. We did this using the software package MlwiN 2.30 (Rasbash et al., 2014), which is spe-
cifically designed for multilevel analyses. Multilevel models have important advantages compared 
to aggregate analyses at the country level, which would require us to transpose individual-level 
data to the contextual level, creating overdetermined or underspecified models. Moreover, aggre-
gate analyses conflate rival individual-level and contextual-level effects, such as the effect of being 
unemployed and the impact of living in a country with high unemployment rates.
To the extent that societal pessimism is rooted in the economic and/or political context, citizens 
are assumed to consciously or implicitly compare their country’s state of affairs to a benchmark. 
The benchmark in this comparison can be cross-national (in comparison to other countries), longi-
tudinal (in comparison to the past), or both (if the comparison is to an absolute standard, regardless 
of time and place) (cf. Van Erkel and Van der Meer, 2016). Recent analyses show that cross-
national and longitudinal models (with country-level fixed effects) may produce fundamentally 
different outcomes (e.g. Schmidt-Catran, 2014; Te Grotenhuis et al., 2015; Van Erkel and Van der 
Meer, 2016). This has important consequences for our research design: we needed to perform 
cross-national as well as within-country longitudinal analyses.
We performed these cross-national and longitudinal analyses in a single model (Fairbrother, 
2014; Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother, 2015). We thus nested individuals in country-waves, which 
were nested in countries. To isolate cross-national effects, we operationalized all the economic and 
political effects as determinants that only vary at L3 (i.e. across countries, but not over time). We 
relied on country means (across the 2006–2012 time span), dummy variables (EMU membership), 
and sum scores (early elections and changes in government; see above). To isolate within-country, 
longitudinal effects, we centered all relevant country-level characteristics, including dummies 
(Enders and Tofighi, 2007), around their longitudinal mean to filter out any cross-national variance 
of these determinants. Finally, using dummy variables that identify each wave, we eliminated joint 
longitudinal variation from the models that existed independently from country-specific variations 
(i.e. survey design effects, or cross-national events).13
A risk in cross-national multilevel models is the problem of multicollinearity. To avoid this, we 
carefully built up our analysis in a stepwise fashion. We first estimated the political and economic 
models of societal pessimism separately. The subsequent model 3 only combines those contextual 
determinants with a b-value larger than the SE.14 We also performed two robustness checks: we 
assessed the robustness of our models by adding variables in a different order, and determined to 
what extent the cross-national models held when we included Greece (which was not included 
because of the extraordinary political and economic developments there and missing data). Both 
checks suggested that the findings are robust.
Descriptive analyses
Descriptive patterns
Figure 1 shows that in the period 2006–2012, 50 percent of Europeans think their country is head-
ing in the wrong direction, 32 percent believe that it is going in the right direction, and 19 percent 
are undecided. Societal pessimism is a rather common phenomenon across Europe. Nevertheless, 
there are considerable differences between countries. Pessimists are in the majority in most nations, 
except for Sweden, Austria, Estonia, and Luxembourg. Their proportion ranges from 68 percent in 
Hungary to 31 percent in Luxembourg. The most pessimistic nations tend to be large Western 
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European countries, some with clear ethnic and cultural divisions, such as France, Spain, Great 
Britain, and Italy. In contrast, the least pessimistic group consists predominantly of relatively small 
Western European countries with well-developed welfare states, such as Luxembourg, Austria, 
Sweden, and the Netherlands. Post-Communist nations, meanwhile, are found both among the 
most societally pessimistic and the most societally optimistic peoples.
Figure 2 presents the development of societal pessimism over time on the pooled data. There is 
no clear linear trend. Societal pessimism first increased with the onset of the Great Recession in the 
fall of 2008, then fell slightly, before rising again in the fall of 2011. The level of societal pessi-
mism is significantly higher after the fourth quarter of 2008 than in the third quarter of 2006. 
Nevertheless, even before the Great Recession, the degree of societal pessimism was already sub-
stantial. Indeed, between 2006 and 2008, the mean level of societal pessimism in Europe was 42 
percent. This means that despite any influence that the Great Recession may have had on societal 
pessimism, it leaves a great deal of the variance unexplained.
Figure 3 shows the development of societal pessimism for all 23 countries during the period of 
study, 2006–2012, sorted from the most to the least societally pessimistic. Three patterns stand out. 
First, societal pessimism is relatively volatile; we see considerable changes in its level in 2006–
2012. Second, this volatility applies to all countries, regardless of whether they are very pessimistic 
or relatively optimistic. Third, the onset of the Great Recession did not increase societal pessimism 
in all countries to the same extent or at the same time; the rapid rise of societal pessimism in Spain 
since the last quarter of 2008 is not a general European pattern.
By breaking down the variance in societal pessimism across the different levels of analysis, we 
can assess how much of the variance is accounted for at the macro-level. Five percent of the total 
variance between optimists and pessimists is situated at the country level, with another 5 percent 
located at the country-wave level. This means that 10 percent of all differences – a substantial 
amount – between optimists and pessimists are accounted for by differences between countries at 
different points in time.15
Figure 1. International distribution of societal pessimism (national means 2006–2012).
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Explanatory analysis
Table 1 reports the results of the multilevel, multinomial regressions we conducted to explain 
within-country, longitudinal differences (L2) and cross-national differences (L3) in societal pessi-
mism. These analyses modeled the chances of being a societal pessimist or undecided rather than 
a societal optimist (reference category). Bold numbers indicate significant effects. The dummy 
variables identifying survey waves are not presented in Table 1 for reasons of space.
As there are very few studies on societal pessimism, we briefly discuss the effects of the individual 
control variables (see Appendix 2). In all the models, education negatively affects societal pessimism, 
whereas unemployment has a positive effect. Furthermore, age matters, with the middle-aged (25–39 
and 40–55) being the most likely to be pessimistic, whereas the oldest cohort (55+) is not more likely 
to be pessimistic about society than those aged 15–25. People in rural areas are more often societally 
pessimistic, while inhabitants of large cities are instead less inclined to societal pessimism.
Political model
Model 1 focuses on political determinants, which explain most of the cross-national variance in 
societal pessimism (69%), and relatively little of the within-country, longitudinal variance (7%). 
We find mixed support for hypothesis H1 on supranationalization. Net payments to the EU have no 
significant cross-national effect but, longitudinally, it has the positive effect we expected (H1a): 
people are more likely to be societally pessimistic (b = 0.17) or undecided (b = 0.09) when their 
country’s net payment to the EU was relatively high in the previous year compared to other years. 
Nevertheless, citizens of EMU countries do not display higher levels of societal pessimism (H1b); 
instead, we find a negative effect (b = −0.49) in countries that had recently adopted the Euro.
The findings on political instability are also ambivalent (H2). The single event of experiencing 
a change in government does not stimulate societal pessimism, but in countries where changes 
in the composition of government are common, societal pessimism is higher (b = 0.14). Early 
elections tend to reduce rather than increase societal pessimism, both longitudinally as an event 
Figure 2. Distribution of societal pessimism 2006–2012 (pooled data).
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Figure 3. (continued)
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Figure 3. Within-country changes in societal pessimism 2006–2012.
(b = −0.27) and as a time-invariant characteristic (b = −0.64). These remarkable results are quite 
robust when it comes to the various model specifications.16 As a consequence, governmental insta-
bility stimulates societal pessimism, while early elections instead provide an optimistic boost.
Corruption does not tend to increase societal pessimism (H3), whether longitudinally or 
cross-nationally.
Economic model
Model 2 focuses exclusively on the economic determinants. Jointly, they explain much less of the 
cross-national variance in societal pessimism than the political determinants (29%), but more of 
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the within-country, longitudinal variance (21%). In fact, we only find significant effects of macro-
economic outcome indicators in the longitudinal part of the model. This is very much in line with 
recent findings in recent sociotropic public opinion research (Han and Chang, 2016; Van Erkel and 
Van der Meer, 2016).
Not all the longitudinal determinants have a significant effect, though. Contrary to our expecta-
tions (H4), the change in the social benefit rate over the previous year is not related to societal 
pessimism. However, as expected, rising economic growth reduces societal pessimism (b = −0.15), 
whereas rising unemployment (b = 0.07) and inflation rates (b = 0.05) increase it. These findings 
are in line with our expectations (H5a–H5c).
Full model
Model 3 includes the L2 and L3 determinants of societal pessimism, with b > SE in models 1 and 
2. None of the effects change direction, although there are some differences in terms of signifi-
cance; in model 3, corruption has a significant between-country effect (b = 0.16), whereas the 
longitudinal effect of inflation and the cross-national effect of early elections both lose signifi-
cance. Overall, the full model explains 68 percent of the cross-national variance in societal pessi-
mism and 25 percent of the within-country longitudinal variance.
Model 3 allows us to draw final conclusions about which hypotheses are confirmed and which 
are not. Supranationalization (H1) only stimulates societal pessimism in the longitudinal part of 
our model. Cross-nationally, we do not find the expected effects of EU net payments, nor of EMU 
membership. On the contrary, we find a negative effect for new Euro countries. This indicates that 
joining the EMU injected a positive sentiment, possibly because it ran parallel with positive (eco-
nomic) developments in a country or because citizens view the supervision by EMU nations of 
their government as a positive, welcome development. Political instability (H2) is related to soci-
etal pessimism, with a track record of government instability stimulating this. Early elections, 
however, are not; instead, we find that it depresses societal pessimism. Hypothesis 2 thus finds 
mixed support. Possibly, early elections reflect the responsiveness of the political system to the 
sentiments of electorates. The third political factor, corruption (H3), indeed increases societal pes-
simism as expected, but only in the cross-national models.
Of the economic factors, the change in the level of social benefits does not affect societal pes-
simism in any way; H4 is not supported by the data. However, several macro-economic perfor-
mance indicators are related to societal pessimism, albeit only longitudinally. In line with H5a, 
economic growth suppresses societal pessimism. Meanwhile, in line with H5b, rising unemploy-
ment boosts pessimism.
Societal pessimism’s distinct dynamic
Finally, we assessed to what extent societal pessimism is a unique attitudinal feature, with its own 
root causes and dynamics. This is particularly relevant in the face of the outcomes presented in 
model 3, which are, in part, similar to findings in political trust research. That literature commonly 
finds that corruption has a consistent negative effect in cross-national analyses, whereas macro-
economic performance only has an impact in longitudinal analyses (cf. Van Erkel and Van der 
Meer, 2016). Consequently, model 4 investigates to what extent our findings are driven by more 
specific judgments. To this end, we added four potential confounders: life satisfaction (about pri-
vate life), macro-economic expectations (about the economic sphere), and parliamentary and gov-
ernmental trust (about the political sphere).
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Model 4 shows that life satisfaction, economic expectations, and political trust are all related to 
societal pessimism in the way one would expect: privately happy, economically optimistic, and 
politically trusting citizens are less likely to be pessimistic about society.
The contextual effects in model 3 are indeed partly driven (mediated) by more specific attitudes. 
Most effect sizes decrease after the inclusion of the specific judgments. Some effects even lose 
significance at p < 0.05. Most noteworthy is the complete collapse of the cross-national effect of 
corruption on societal distrust (b = −0.02, ns). Additional analyses (not displayed here) reveal that 
this collapse is primarily due to the inclusion of political attitudes. Apparently, corruption increases 
societal pessimism primarily because it makes people pessimistic about the political system. In 
contrast, the longitudinal effects of two macro-economic performance indicators (growth, unem-
ployment rates) retain most of their strength, as well as their significance, even after the inclusion 
of subjective economic expectations.
Overall, model 4 confirms that the effects of the political and economic contexts on societal 
pessimism are partly, but not exclusively, driven by citizens’ specific judgments of their private 
lives, the state of the economy, and politics. This underlines the notion that societal pessimism is 
conceptually distinct from these more extensively studied, more specific judgments. Societal pes-
simism is an attitude with a dynamic of its own, in addition to known attitudes in public opinion 
research such as political trust or economic expectations.
Conclusion and discussion
Societal pessimism, namely, the sentiment that society is in decline, is thriving in Europe. Indeed, 
between 2006 and 2012, approximately 50 percent of the adult population could be classified as a 
societal pessimist. This article aimed to examine to what extent societal pessimism is itself a reflec-
tion of political and economic developments. On the one hand, we expected political characteristics 
– supranationalization, political instability, and corruption – to drive societal pessimism because they 
signal and strengthen (the impression of) collective powerlessness to change the status quo. On the 
other hand, we suggested that societal pessimism may find its roots in economic developments – fall-
ing social benefits, economic decline – that increase citizens’ socioeconomic vulnerability.
Our multilevel models separate within-country, longitudinal variance from cross-national vari-
ance. Intriguingly, economic factors such as economic growth and unemployment rates signifi-
cantly affect longitudinal, within-country differences, but do not explain structural, cross-national 
differences in societal pessimism. This is remarkably similar to recent findings in political trust 
research. In contrast, cross-national differences in societal pessimism depend mostly on political 
determinants: corruption and governmental instability increase it. The only exception to this pat-
tern is the political factor of net EU payments, which explains the longitudinal variation. Contrary 
to our expectations, societal pessimism is lower in new EMU countries than in non-EMU nations, 
possibly because joining the EU reflects positive developments in a country or because citizens 
welcome the supervision of their government.
It is theoretically remarkable that welfare state retrenchment has no significant effect on societal 
pessimism, either in the cross-national or in the longitudinal analyses. Theorists have considered wel-
fare state retrenchment to be a particularly stressful and pervasive feature of contemporary society (e.g. 
Bauman, 2006, 2007; Samuelson, 1995). Nevertheless, empirically, we find no evidence that it relates 
to societal pessimism. Possibly, the stress associated with welfare state retrenchment may not be due 
to the level of benefits (as we tested in this article), but instead to citizens’ eligibility and access.
Overall, our models explain most cross-national variance in societal pessimism (68%), but 
relatively little of the longitudinal variance (25%). These longitudinal changes may follow more 
idiosyncratic events such as scandals or terrorist threats that are likely to have a similar short-term 
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impact on societal pessimism as they do on political trust. Moreover, this study faced serious data 
limitations when it came to unpacking the underlying causal chain. To do this adequately would 
require more and different types of information from our respondents. To the extent that societal 
pessimism can be understood as an evaluation of political and economic contexts, we ought to find 
(1) that citizens correctly interpret the macro-factors we study. This is assumed in research on 
context effects on public opinion, and is shown to be the case for some factors such as corruption 
(Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012). Therefore, although it is likely that citizens could learn about the 
state of the economy, the unemployment rate, or net EU payments through the media or govern-
ment statements, the causal test would be improved with tests of citizens’ knowledge of those fac-
tors. Furthermore, we ought to find that (2) the macro–micro relationships central in this study are 
mediated by citizens’ evaluations, and (3) that citizens extrapolate current trends to a distant (but 
not necessarily too distant) future. The focus on citizens’ knowledge, evaluations, and temporal 
extrapolations seems to be a fruitful path for future research on the roots of societal pessimism, 
albeit one that requires new and more detailed survey measures.
Nevertheless, this study establishes that societal pessimism is indeed partly rooted in (or, rather, 
is a reflection of) the political and economic context. Cross-national differences and longitudinal 
changes in economic and political performance are clearly perceived by citizens. At least to some 
extent, people become pessimistic about society for good reasons. This means that sociologists and 
political scientists should not interpret societal pessimism as a superficial mood or a psychological 
attribute. Moreover, future research should pay more attention to other objective circumstances 
that contribute to societal pessimism. Beyond the economic and political factors, other societal 
developments deserve scrutiny. One can think of immigration flows, which could be experienced 
as a cultural decline, but also the emigration from rural areas that face a very concrete deterioration 
in the form of empty houses and fewer shops and public facilities.
This conclusion has two implications for society. On the one hand, there is a risk that enduring 
societal pessimism – itself caused by political instability and/or economic recession – induces 
further stagnation and pessimism. On the other, these very same political and economic roots of 
societal pessimism imply that such a self-fulfilling prophecy can be offset by changes in the institu-
tions and policies that we find here to affect societal pessimism. Such changes could include less 
political instability (changes in government), dealing with corruption hands-on, and formulating 
economic policies to support economic growth and bring down unemployment. Political leaders do 
not, therefore, have to sit back and watch societal pessimism take its course.
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Notes
 1. Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) use the term ‘sociotropic’ to refer to voting motivations inspired by the 
collectivity. This is in contrast to ‘pocketbook’ voting, which is based on the personal (financial) 
situation.
 2. Both causes have been investigated in the literature. The first is called ‘unrealistic optimism’ or ‘opti-
mistic bias’: a tendency to think one’s own risk in the face of any type of danger is lower than aver-
age (Weinstein, 1980). From health-related risks to expectations about one’s personal future, if you are 
mentally healthy, you are likely to be overly optimistic about your personal vulnerability and chances of 
happiness and success (Chapin, 2000; for an overview, see Taylor and Brown, 1988). The media effect 
is called the ‘impersonal impact hypothesis’ or ‘media malaise’, and states that personal and societal risk 
judgments are two separate things, and that mass media primarily affect the perception of societal prob-
lems, whereas personal experiences determine the perception of one’s personal situation (Culbertson 
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and Stempel, 1985; Tyler and Cook, 1984). Some studies confirm this media effect (Mutz, 1992; Tyler, 
1980), but others do not (Park et al., 2001; Shrum and Bischak, 2001).
 3. Eurobarometers (EBs) 66.1 (Sept.–Oct. 2006), 68.1 (Sept.–Nov. 2007), 69.2 (Mar.–May 2008), 
70.1 (Oct.–Nov. 2008), 71.1 (Jan.–Feb. 2009), 71.3 (Jun.–Jul. 2009), 72.4 (Oct.–Nov. 2009), 73.4 
(May 2010), 74.2 (Nov 2010), 75.3 (May 2011), 76.3 (Nov 2011), 77.3 (May 2012), and 78.1 
(Nov 2012).
 4. Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.
 5. EB survey data were collected separately for East and West Germany, but country-level indicators are 
only available for Germany as a whole. The data for East and West Germany are merged. To create a 
ratio of respondents between East and West Germany that fits the demographic reality (1:4), 250 of the 
500 respondents from East Germany were randomly deleted from each wave.
 6. We measured our time-variant independent variables at Level 2 in the 6–12 months before each survey 
wave. The introduction of a lag does justice to the causal scheme underlying the hypotheses. The specific 
length of this lag has been largely a methodological choice: We aimed to measure the independent vari-
ables closely before the dependent variable. For measures that are collected on a yearly basis, this meant a 
12-month lag. For measures that are collected more frequently, we decided upon a shorter lag. Other studies 
show that the length of this lag does not affect the significance or direction of effects (cf. Van Erkel and Van 
der Meer, 2016).
 7. For all independent variables, and especially in the case of net European Union (EU) payments, the 
question can be raised whether or to what extent citizens are aware of these political and economic 
developments. We reflect on the importance of political and economic knowledge of citizens as a 
limitation of this study in the conclusion. Nevertheless, we expect that important developments in 
the political and economic arena are covered by the media, and in the case of net EU payments, espe-
cially in the ‘net paying countries’. This informs citizens about the political and economic status of 
their country.
 8. Non-European Monetary Union (EMU) countries: Czech Republic, Denmark, Great Britain, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden. New EMU countries: Estonia, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
Established EMU countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
 9. We checked whether shortening the time span to the years 2005–2011 would change the results, but it did 
not; only the effects turned out to be smaller.
10. http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-statistics.htm. Five countries had missing values in the 
2006–2003 wave, which were dealt with by adding a dummy to the analyses.
11. Education was originally measured in terms of the number of years of education, where 15 years or fewer 
was used as a low educational level, 16–19 years as a medium level of education, and 20 years or more 
as highly educated.
12. The formulation of the original question only offered the option of being undecided if it was mentioned 
spontaneously. Consequently, it cannot be treated as a mere middle category in an ordered probit analy-
sis, having, at least in part, different determinants.
13. A typical example of such a cross-national event outside the scope of the analyses was the terrorist 
attacks on 9/11, which led to both a ‘rally round the flag’ (a boost in trust) and an increase in fear across 
Western countries.
14. As we do not have hypotheses on the undecided group, these results did not drive the decision to drop or 
keep variables in the various steps.
15. The differences between optimists and the undecided are, to a lesser extent, situated in the macro-level 
(3% and 2%, respectively).
16. We checked whether the results changed when adding to model 1 only changes in government, early 
elections or regular elections, or two out of the three. This had no impact. While early elections lost their 
significance in one of the alternative models, the effect was still in the same direction. Furthermore, 
using an alternative operationalization (see Note 9) did not alter the results.
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Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics of variables used in cross-national analyses (Model 1–4).
Variable Mean SD Min. Max.
Societal pessimism 2.18 0.88 1 3
Individual-level control variables
 Gender (1 = male) 0.54 0.50 0 1
 Age (4 dummies)
  15–24 0.11 0.32 0 1
  25–39 0.23 0.42 0 1
  40–54 0.26 0.44 0 1
  55+ 0.39 0.49 0 1
 Community (3 dummies)
  Rural area or village 0.36 0.48 0 1
  Small- or middle-sized town 0.38 0.49 0 1
  Large city 0.26 0.44 0 1
 Level of education (4 dummies)
  15− 0.18 0.39 0 1
  16–19 0.44 0.50 0 1
  20+ 0.30 0.46 0 1
  Still studying 0.08 0.27 0 1
 occupation (3 dummies)
  Employed 0.50 0.50 0 1
  Unemployed 0.08 0.27 0 1
  Other 0.42 0.49 0 1
 Low life satisfaction 0.21 0.41 0 1
 Negative economic expectation 0.40 0.49 0 1
 distrust of Parliament 0.61 0.49 0 1
 Distrust of government 0.63 0.48 0 1
Macro-variables: Political factors
 Mean net EU payment −0.71 1.21 −3.79 0.36
 EMU countries (3 groups)  
  Non-EMU countries 0.37 0.48 0 1
  New EMU countries 0.16 0.36 0 1
  Established EMU countries 0.48 0.50 0 1
 Mean governmental changes 0.46 0.22 0.16 1.07
 Mean early elections 0.08 0.09 0 0.23
 Mean regular elections 0.29 0.07 0.16 0.40
 Mean corruption 3.23 1.68 0.64 5.47
Macro-variables: Economic factors
 Mean social benefits change −0.22 0.66 −1.51 1.40
 Mean GDP growth 0.01 0.38 −0.58 1.00
 Mean unemployment 8.61 2.97 4.02 16.68
 Mean inflation 2.97 1.43 1.17 7.06
SD: standard deviation; EU: European Union; GDP: gross domestic product; EMU: European Monetary Union.
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Appendix 2. Model 3 (full).a,b,c
Model 3
 Pessimists Undecided
 b SE b SE
Individual attitudes
 Gender (male) 0.23* 0.01 0.20* 0.01
 Age (ref.: 40–54)
  15–24 −0.23* 0.02 −0.22* 0.02
  25–39 −0.10* 0.01 −0.10* 0.02
  55+ −0.18* 0.01 −0.11* 0.02
 Education (ref.: medium)
  Low 0.27* 0.01 0.15* 0.02
  High −0.33* 0.01 −0.20* 0.13
  Student −0.38* 0.02 −0.27* 0.03
 Occupation status (ref.: employed)
  Unemployed 0.48* 0.02 0.20* 0.02
  Other 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02
 Community (ref.: small town)
  Rural village 0.04* 0.01 0.03* 0.01
  Large town −0.07* 0.01 −0.05* 0.01
L2: Country-wave level: political
 Centered net EU payment 0.20* 0.05 0.11* 0.04
 Centered changes government  
 Event early elections −0.22* 0.12 −0.01 0.08
 Event elections 0.18* 0.07 −0.01 0.05
 Centered corruption  
L2: Country-wave level: economic
 Centered change social benefits  
 Centered GDP growth −0.16* 0.04 −0.07* 0.03
 Centered unemployment 0.08* 0.01 0.05* 0.01
 Centered inflation 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01
L3: Country level: political
 Mean net EU payment  
 EMU (ref. = no euro)
  New euro countries −0.45* 0.23 0.26 0.22
  Established euro countries −0.04 0.20 0.31* 0.18
 Changes in government 2000–2011 0.16* 0.06 0.11* 0.05
 Early elections 2000–2011 −0.28 0.34 0.60* 0.32
 Mean elections −0.69 1.04 −1.00 0.97
 Mean corruption 0.16* 0.06 0.16* 0.05
L3 Country level: economic
 Mean change in social benefits  
 Mean GDP growth  
 Mean unemployment  
 Mean inflation  
Explained variance
 Country-wave level % 25 20  
 Country level % 68 64  
SE: standard error; EU: European Union; GDP: gross domestic product; EMU: European Monetary Union.
aMultinomial multilevel analysis with three levels; PQL second-order estimates; reference category = optimists.
bb-coefficients are log odds; asterisks indicate significant with *p < 0.05 (one-sided tests).
cModels control for Survey wave.
